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CHAPTER 8a
Preliminary References under EU Law
Armin Cuyvers
8.1 Introduction
The preliminary reference procedure allows national courts to ask questions 
on EU law to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The impor-
tance of preliminary references becomes readily apparent when one realizes 
the EU has over 500 million citizens and companies, but there are only 84 
judges in the EU Court in Luxembourg. Consequently, it is the tens of thou-
sands of national judges that have to uphold and apply EU law in practice. It is 
these national judges that have to turn EU law into a living, enforceable reality 
within each Member State.1
Because of their central role, it is essential that all these national courts 
apply EU law correctly and consistently. The application of EU law, after all, 
should not depend on which national judge you happen to end up with. At 
the same time, a uniform application of EU law is far from automatic. Each 
lawyer is shaped by his or her own national legal system and culture, and will 
unavoidably approach EU law from this national perspective, even if it is often 
unwittingly so. Without guidance, therefore, it is likely that a British lawyer 
with a common law background and a French lawyer with a civil law back-
ground would arrive at different interpretations of the same EU law concepts, 
even though these concepts have their autonomous EU meaning and should 
not be affected by national law. To protect the unity and effectiveness of EU 
law, therefore, it is essential that the Court of Justice provides guidance on the 
correct interpretation of EU law, and is enabled to assist national courts that 
are faced with certain doubts about the right interpretation of EU law.2
The preliminary reference mechanism is one of the key instruments 
enabling the CJEU to provide this guidance, and cooperate with national 
1   For more elaborate discussion of the preliminary reference procedure see inter alia M. Broberg 
and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd edn, 2014), 
and on the process in new Member States, which maybe of special interest to the EAC, 
M. Bobek, ‘Learning to talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and 
the Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 1611.
2   Cf. Opinion 1/09 Patent Court [2011] ECR I-1137.
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courts. Indeed, many of the most foundational rulings on EU law, including 
Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. were given in preliminary reference pro-
ceedings, further illustrating the importance of this mechanism.3 This chapter 
systematically discusses the different legal issues and complications prelimi-
nary references may give rise to, and the legal solutions developed in the EU to 
ensure the proper functioning of this mechanism. To structure this discussion, 
it follows the different steps of a preliminary ruling procedure, starting with 
the question of which bodies are allowed to ask references, and if national 
law is allowed to limit the right of courts to ask a reference. Subsequently, this 
chapter discusses when national courts may actually have an obligation to ask 
a preliminary reference, instead of just a right, or conversely, when the CJEU 
may declare a preliminary reference inadmissible. Lastly, it must be discussed 
what the CJEU may rule on in a preliminary judgment, and what a national 
court should do with the preliminary judgment it receives from the CJEU.
8.2 Courts and Tribunals Allowed to Refer a Preliminary Question
Article 267 TFEU states that a preliminary question may be asked by ‘any court 
or tribunal of a Member State’. The CJEU by now has clarified that to qualify 
as a court or tribunal, a body must meet all, or at least most, of the following 
criteria to a high degree:
i. It has to be established by law;
ii. It has to be permanent;
iii. It must have compulsory jurisdiction;
iv. It must deal with procedures inter partes;
v. It must apply rules of law
vi. And lastly it must be independent.4
Whether a specific body qualifies has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
whereby the CJEU tends to be supportive of the body wanting to refer where 
possible.5 The CJEU has, however, adhered to its position that normally arbitral 
tribunals do not qualify as a court or tribunal under Article 267 TFEU, unless 
3   See also F. Mancini and D. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge 
Facing the European Court’ (1991) 11 YBEL, 1.
4   See Case C-14/86 Pretore di Salò ECLI:EU:C:1987:275, or more recently Case C-210/06 Cartesio 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:723.
5   See for example Case C-408/98 Abrahamsson ECLI:EU:C:2000:367.
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there is a very close link between the arbitration and the ordinary judicial sys-
tem of a Member State.6 This might be understandable as many arbitral pro-
ceedings fail to meet many of the criteria given and many arbiters might not 
even want to ask a reference, taking into account the year and a half it takes 
on average to get an answer. Yet the inability of arbiters to refer questions to 
the CJEU is also increasingly problematic. To begin with, arbitration is becom-
ing increasingly common. In addition, the CJEU has also held that arbiters are 
obligated to respect EU law of public order, such as EU competition law, in 
their awards. A failure to respect EU law therefore leads to an obligation on 
national judges to annul an arbitral award and to refuse execution.7 Arbiters, 
therefore, are bound by EU law, but are unable to ask guidance on it.
In the EAC context, the EACJ has already directly referred to Pretore di Salò 
in determining which Courts and Tribunals are allowed to refer a question to 
it.8 Building on this solid start, one may also consider if these criteria could 
perhaps be further developed to take the specific context of East Africa into 
account, for example by including systems of customary law or dispute settle-
ment into the circle of courts and tribunals that are allowed to refer. In addi-
tion, the EAC may have an opportunity to reconsider the standing of arbitral 
awards, and perhaps find a more balanced solution than the one chose in 
the EU.
8.3 The Sacred Right to Refer
The CJEU has made it very clear that the right of a court or tribunal to refer 
a question to the CJEU may never be limited.9 Neither national law nor 
higher courts are allowed to limit the freedom of a court to refer. For exam-
ple, national higher courts may not prohibit lower courts to ask a preliminary 
question in a specific case or on a point they have already ruled upon in an 
injunction. Similarly, the CJEU held that a French draft-law that would obligate 
lower courts to first refer a question to the French Constitutional Court before 
6   See for example Case C-102/81 Nordsee ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 or Case C-377/13 Ascendi Beiras 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:1754.
7   Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v. Benneton ECLI:EU:C:1999:269.
8   See Chapter 8 par.1 and Case Stated No. 1 of 2014 Attorney General of Uganda vs.and Tom 
Kyahurwenda [2015]. (EACJ, 2015) [54].
9   See already Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf ECLI:EU:C:1974:3.
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they could refer a preliminary question to the CJEU violated the right of lower 
courts under Article 267 TFEU.10
No limit may be imposed, therefore, on the right of any court to ask a pre-
liminary reference to the CJEU. By defending this absolute right of national 
courts, the CJEU also ensures that the channel of communication with lower 
courts remains open. Any risk that national law or higher courts may try to 
prevent any questions from reaching the CJEU is thereby addressed. In addi-
tion, this allows lower courts to enlist the support of the CJEU when they for 
example think a ruling of their own supreme court or an act of parliament con-
flicts with EU law. Lower courts may, justly so, have some reservations before 
overruling their own supreme courts through the supremacy of EU law, and 
may hence prefer some confirmation and borrowed authority from the CJEU.11 
At the same time, lower courts must also carefully consider if, in a concrete 
case, it might perhaps not be better to leave it to the Court of Appeal to refer 
a question, as at that stage of the proceedings the facts of the case and the rel-
evant legal issues may have been clarified and come into sharper focus.
8.4 A Right or an Obligation to Refer?
Article 267 TFEU makes a distinction between lower courts, which may refer a 
preliminary question and ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy’, which shall refer a question to the CJEU 
when a question of EU law arises. In some cases, therefore, national courts 
actually have a legal obligation under EU law to ask a preliminary question.12
When deciding if an obligation to refer exists, it is useful to first distinguish 
between questions on the validity of EU law and questions on the interpreta-
tion of EU law. Subsequently, it is necessary to establish which courts fall under 
the obligation to refer, and which exceptions the CJEU has developed through 
its case law on the obligation to refer.
10   Case C-188/10 Melki en Abdeli ECLI:EU:C:2010:363.
11   See EU chapter 4 on the doctrine of supremacy. One of the effects of this supremacy is 
that lower courts can escape the normal judicial hierarchy, as their power to overturn or 
ignore a ruling from their own supreme court, or even a provision of their own constitu-
tion, derives from EU law itself, not just from their own judicial authority.
12   The failure to do so may even lead to Member State liability for the breach of this obliga-
tion to refer, even if this action will only be successful in extreme cases. See Case C-224/01 
Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239.
 279Preliminary References Under Eu Law
8.4.1 Questions on Validity versus Questions on the Interpretation of  
EU Law
National courts can refer two different kinds of question to the CJEU. The first 
type of question concerns the validity of EU law. Such a question essentially 
asks if a certain rule of EU law might be invalid because it conflicts with a 
higher norm of EU law. In Digital Rights Ireland, for example, the High Court 
of Ireland and the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof both asked a prelimi-
nary question on the validity of the data retention directive, as they thought 
this directive inter alia violated fundamental rights protected under the EU 
Charter.13 The second type of questions concerns the interpretation of EU law, 
and basically asks how a certain rule of EU law should be interpreted.
Since the CJEU is the only court with the authority to declare EU law invalid, 
national courts are always under an obligation to refer a validity question to 
the CJEU if they want to question the validity of an EU act. National courts 
are, therefore, allowed to hold that an EU act is valid, but not that an EU act 
is invalid.14 Consequently, the entire question of whether a court may or must 
refer a preliminary question only concerns the second type of questions, being 
questions on the interpretation of EU law.
8.4.2 Courts with an Obligation to Refer
Only courts against whose decision there is no remedy can be under the obli-
gation to refer. This is a factual test that requires a case-by-case assessment. For 
example, national law may not allow an appeal from a court of first instance 
to a court of appeal if the monetary interest at stake is too low, or if the case 
concerns a labor dispute. In such cases, no remedy exists against the court of 
first instance, and even a court of first instance might be obligated to ask a 
preliminary reference. It is incorrect, therefore, to summarize Article 267 TFEU 
as holding that only supreme courts or constitutional courts are under an obli-
gation to refer. The fact that a remedy depends on a supreme court accepting 
a case, or that an appeal to the supreme court is only allowed on points of 
law, however, does not make the decision of a court of appeal into a decision 
13   Joined Cases C-293 and 594/12 Data Retention Directive, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
14   The only, very limited, exception is that national courts may, in exceptional circum-
stances where irreparable harm may be caused by enforcing a rule of EU law, provide an 
interim measure disapplying that rule of EU law in the particular case whilst they await 
the preliminary ruling of the CJEU on validity. See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
Cuyvers280
against which there is no remedy, even if the supreme court in the end refuses 
to hear the case.15
8.4.3 Exceptions to the Obligation to Refer: The CILFIT Doctrine
Even where no legal remedy exists, however, national courts may not be obli-
gated to refer a question. In the famous CILFIT judgment the CJEU formu-
lated three exceptions to the obligations to refer. Firstly, no obligation exists 
where the question of EU law ‘is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to 
that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome 
of the case.’16 Secondly, a reference is not required ‘where previous decisions of 
the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective 
of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the 
questions at issue are not strictly identical.’17 This second exception is known 
as the acte eclairé doctrine, and means that courts do not have to ask questions 
of law that, in their opinion, have already been clarified in previous judgments of 
the CJEU. Of course whether the question at stake has really been settled by 
previous CJEU case law is an assessment the national courts has to make.
The third exception is known as the acte clair doctrine, and removes the 
obligation to refer where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious for 
the national court that no reference is deemed necessary. In the words of the 
CJEU: ‘Finally, the correct application of Community law may be so obvious as 
to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the ques-
tion raised is to be resolved.’18 This third exception is potentially the most far 
reaching, as it creates the risk of national courts imposing their own, incorrect 
interpretation on EU law, either intentionally or unwittingly. For this reason 
the CJEU adds several warnings to national courts, and implores them to not 
assume that the correct interpretation is clear too easily:
Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court 
or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the 
courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. Only if 
those conditions are satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain 
from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself 
the responsibility for resolving it.
15   Case C-99/00 Kenny Roland Lykkeskog, ECLI:EU:C:2002:329 and Case C-210/06 Cartesio 
[2008] ECR I-9641.
16   Case 283/81 CILFIT ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, par. 10.
17   Idem, par. 14.
18   Idem, par. 16.
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However, the existence of such a possibility must be assessed on the 
basis of the characteristic features of Community law and the particular 
difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise.
To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community legislation is 
drafted in several languages and that the different language versions are 
all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law 
thus involves a comparison of the different language versions.
It must also be borne in mind, even where the different language 
versions are entirely in accord with one another, that Community law 
uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it must be empha-
sized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in 
Community law and in the law of the various Member States.
Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in its con-
text and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a 
whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolu-
tion at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied.19
At the same time, this does not mean that national high courts must refer 
every time some doubt remains. After all, it is part of the responsibility of high 
courts to settle doubts, even if there may be disagreements on the law with or 
between lower courts. As the CJEU recently clarified in Ferreira da Silva:
In itself, the fact that other national courts or tribunals have given con-
tradictory decisions is not a conclusive factor capable of triggering the 
obligation set out in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU.
A court or tribunal adjudicating at last instance may take the view 
that, although the lower courts have interpreted a provision of EU law in 
a particular way, the interpretation that it proposes to give of that provi-
sion, which is different from the interpretation espoused by the lower 
courts, is so obvious that there is no reasonable doubt.
However, so far as the area under consideration in the present case 
is concerned and as is clear from paragraphs 24 to 27 of this judgment, 
the question as to how the concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ should 
be interpreted has given rise to a great deal of uncertainty on the part of 
many national courts and tribunals which, as a consequence, have found 
it necessary to make a reference to the Court of Justice. That uncertainty 
19   Idem, paras 17–20. See for further discussion also D. Edward, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost in 
their Historical and Procedural Context’, in: The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of 
EU law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010), 173.
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shows not only that there are difficulties of interpretation, but also that 
there is a risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European 
Union.
It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the case before the 
referring court, which are characterised both by conflicting lines of case-
law at national level regarding the concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ 
within the meaning of Directive 2001/23 and by the fact that that con-
cept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in the various 
Member States, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law must comply with its obli-
gation to make a reference to the Court, in order to avert the risk of an 
incorrect interpretation of EU law.20
Although the CJEU therefore allows the acte clair doctrine to be applied where 
national lower courts disagree, it does not allow it where there is disagreement 
or confusion between the courts of multiple Member States. Such disagree-
ment between Member States would threaten the uniformity of EU law and 
indicate the necessity of a preliminary ruling to provide an authoritative EU 
interpretation.
These exceptions to the obligation to refer, and the leeway granted to 
national courts by the CJEU, reflect the cooperative nature of the preliminary 
reference procedure. The CJEU heavily relies on the national courts to refer 
the important cases to it, and to correctly implement the preliminary rulings 
it gives. Even though EU law itself is supreme, and national courts are under 
a legal obligation to implement any preliminary ruling given, the entire pre-
liminary question mechanism depends on mutual respect and a good working 
relation between the CJEU and national courts. This mutual respect includes 
trusting national courts, certainly national supreme courts, to assess when 
a preliminary reference is required and when it is not. Vice versa, national 
courts must take seriously their duty to refer questions on interpretation, also 
as referring the right questions allows the CJEU to ensure the correct and uni-
form interpretation of EU law.
20   Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva ECLI:EU:C:2015:565, paras 41–44.
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8.5 Admissibility of Preliminary References
When a national court refers a question, the CJEU is in principle obligated to 
provide a preliminary answer.21 Ultimately, however, the CJEU retains the final 
say over its own jurisdiction, which means that it can also declare preliminary 
references inadmissible. Generally, the CJEU does not want to reject references, 
both out of respect for the national courts asking them and because it needs 
preliminary questions to fulfill its function. The CJEU will even try to ‘rescue’ 
poorly drafted questions where possible, so as to provide a helpful response to 
the national court. Over time, however, the CJEU has developed three general 
grounds on which a reference may be declared inadmissible.
Firstly, a reference is inadmissible where the question asked is obviously 
irrelevant to solve the dispute before the national court.22 Secondly, a refer-
ence may be declared inadmissible where the dispute between the parties 
is hypothetical. This concerns disputes that have been construed by the par-
ties with the sole purpose of acquiring a judicial ruling on a certain question, 
but where there is no real dispute between the parties.23 Test-cases, however, 
are allowed, as long as there is a real dispute concerned. Lastly, the CJEU may 
also declare a reference inadmissible where the case file sent by the national 
court does not provide sufficient factual and legal information to usefully 
answer the questions posed.24 Of course a national court is then allowed to 
improve the file and resend it.25
The fact that a question asked by a national court has already been clari-
fied in earlier case law, or the correct interpretation is obvious, is not a ground 
for inadmissibility. These CILFIT exceptions only remove the obligation of 
national courts to refer, they do not remove the right to refer where national 
courts want to do so.
21   See for example case C-220/05 Auroux ECLI:EU:C:2007:31.
22   Cf. Case C-293/03 My ECLI:EU:C:2004:821 or Case C-152/03 Ritter-Coulais ECLI:EU: 
C:2006:123.
23   Case 244/80 Foglia ECLI:EU:C:1981:302 or Case C-225/02 Garcia Blanco ECLI:EU:C:2005:34.
24   See for example Case C-567/07 Sint-Servatius ECLI:EU:C:2009:593.
25   The CJEU has also provided national courts with a communication providing recommen-
dations on how to submit preliminary references, published in OJ [2012] C 338/1.
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8.6 Status and Effect of the Preliminary Ruling
In a preliminary ruling, the CJEU may only rule on the validity of EU law or 
provide the correct interpretation of a rule of EU law. The CJEU is not allowed 
to interpret national law, or to settle the underlying dispute between parties. It 
remains up to the national court to apply the interpretation given by the CJEU 
to the case at hand. What the CJEU can do, however, is to provide an interpre-
tation of EU law that is so specific, and is so closely linked to the facts of the 
case, that it de facto determines the decision the national court should take.26 
In other cases, the CJEU may only provide a more general interpretation of EU 
law, and thereby leave a broad discretion to the national court, for example to 
determine the proportionality of a measure.27
A preliminary answer is legally binding on the national court that referred 
the question to the CJEU.28 In addition, a preliminary ruling is also binding on 
all other national courts, as it provides the authoritative interpretation of EU 
law.29 Preliminary rulings, therefore, have an erga omnes binding effect, and 
function as legal precedents. Normally, the interpretation provided by the CJEU 
also has retroactive effect, meaning it determines how the provision should 
always have been interpreted, also in the past (ex tunc).30 In exceptional cases, 
however, the CJEU may limit the effect of a preliminary reference in time, for 
example because legal certainty requires so or the practical implications of ex 
tunc application would be to severe. In Defrenne, for example, the CJEU limited 
the effects of its ruling on equal pay between men and women based on (now) 
Article 157(1) TFEU, as full retroactive effect would require governments and 
companies to compensate lower wages going back for more than a decade.31
26   See for example Case C-180/04 Vasallo ECLI:EU:C:2006:518.
27   See for an overview and analysis of different approaches T. Tridimas, ‘Constitutional 
Review of Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’, 
(2011) 9 I-CON 737.
28   Case 52/76 Benedetti ECLI:EU:C:1977:16.
29   This obligation also derives from Article 4(3) TEU. See also Joined Cases 28–30/62 
Da Costa ECLI:EU:C:1963:6.
30   J. Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in 
the Community Legal System’, (2005) 42 CMLRev, 9.
31   43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (Defrenne II), ECLI:EU:C:1976:56. Also see Case C-262/88 
Barber ECLI:EU:C:1990:209.
